{"id":510,"date":"2026-01-31T10:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-01-31T09:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/?p=510"},"modified":"2026-03-02T14:13:13","modified_gmt":"2026-03-02T13:13:13","slug":"ftx-utoelete-tanulsagok","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/ftx-utoelete-tanulsagok\/","title":{"rendered":"The FTX Aftermath: What We Learned from Crypto History's Biggest Collapse"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2>The FTX Collapse: Crypto's Lehman Brothers Moment<\/h2>\n<p>On November 11, 2022, <strong>FTX<\/strong> \u2013 the world's third-largest crypto exchange \u2013 filed for bankruptcy protection. <strong>Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF)<\/strong>, the founder once estimated at $26 billion, went to prison. Billions in customer funds disappeared. Now, more than three years later, what did we learn from this shocking event, and how did it reshape the crypto world?<\/p>\n<h2>What Exactly Happened?<\/h2>\n<h3>The Rise<\/h3>\n<p>FTX launched in 2019 and grew at meteoric pace, seeming like a true success story:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>By 2022, it became the <strong>world's 3rd largest<\/strong> crypto exchange.<\/li>\n<li>In the last funding round, the company's valuation was estimated at <strong>$32 billion<\/strong> .<\/li>\n<li>World-famous investors like Sequoia Capital, SoftBank, and Tiger Global invested in FTX.<\/li>\n<li>FTX's marketing campaigns featured celebrities like Tom Brady, Steph Curry, and Larry David.<\/li>\n<li>Sam Bankman-Fried became a darling of Washington political circles, thanks to his significant political donations and regulatory lobbying.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>The Collapse<\/h3>\n<p>In November 2022, <strong>CoinDesk<\/strong> leaked a document showing the balance sheet of Alameda Research (SBF's trading firm):<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A large portion of Alameda's assets were <strong>FTT tokens<\/strong> \u2013 FTX's own token, whose value became shaky.<\/li>\n<li>Binance CEO CZ announced he would sell his FTT holdings, triggering panic.<\/li>\n<li>A bank run started, with customers rushing to withdraw their funds en masse.<\/li>\n<li>FTX could not serve the payouts \u2013 it turned out that <strong>client funds were lent to Alameda.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>The FTX empire collapsed in 48 hours.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>The damages<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Missing client funds: <strong>~$8-10 billion<\/strong>which never returned to clients.<\/li>\n<li>The FTT token's value dropped to practically zero.<\/li>\n<li>Solana's price plunged ~80% due to Alameda's large SOL positions.<\/li>\n<li>Numerous companies went bankrupt through the domino effect, such as BlockFi and Genesis.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>The court proceedings<\/h2>\n<p>SBF's trial took place in October 2023 and concluded with the following results:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Found guilty on 7 charges<\/strong>including fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering.<\/li>\n<li>Sentenced to 25 years in prison.<\/li>\n<li>Several associates, including Caroline Ellison, Gary Wang, and Nishad Singh, cooperated with the prosecution and received lighter sentences.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>The bankruptcy proceedings: a surprising turn<\/h2>\n<p>The most surprising development was the outcome of the FTX bankruptcy proceedings, which took an unexpectedly positive turn:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The bankruptcy trustee, <strong>John J. Ray III<\/strong> (the same person who handled the Enron case) efficiently uncovered and recovered assets.<\/li>\n<li>In 2024-2025, FTX largely repaid clients \u2013 at the exchange rate valid at the time of the petition.<\/li>\n<li>Ironically, since Bitcoin doubled in the meantime, clients received their money in dollars but missed out on the crypto price appreciation.<\/li>\n<li>The full repayment is one of the greatest bankruptcy proceeding successes in crypto history.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Why Does This Matter?<\/h2>\n<p>The collapse of FTX was not merely the fall of a crypto exchange, but a warning sign for the entire industry. What does this mean for the crypto world?<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Crisis of trust:<\/strong> The fall of FTX showed that trust in the crypto world is fragile and how important transparency is.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Regulatory pressure:<\/strong> Governments and regulatory authorities worldwide recognized the need for stricter oversight of crypto exchanges.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Technological development:<\/strong> Events highlighted the importance of decentralization, which is the fundamental principle of cryptocurrencies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>What did we learn?<\/h2>\n<h3>1. \"Not your keys, not your coins\"<\/h3>\n<p>The most important lesson: if you don't hold your crypto (in your own wallet, with your own keys), then <strong>it's not really yours<\/strong>. Exchanges are custodian service providers \u2013 in case of bankruptcy, you're in line with other creditors. This is a clear message for every crypto owner to consider using their own wallets.<\/p>\n<h3>2. Regulation is necessary<\/h3>\n<p>FTX had no meaningful oversight (registered in the Bahamas). MiCA, SEC enforcement, and institutional standards are partly built on FTX's lessons:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Segregated client assets requirement \u2013 meaning client funds must be kept separate from the exchange's own assets.<\/li>\n<li>Regular audits \u2013 for the transparency of financial reports.<\/li>\n<li>Capital requirements \u2013 to ensure that the exchange is always able to cover client claims.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>3. Proof-of-reserves is not enough<\/h3>\n<p>After FTX, many exchanges issued \"proof-of-reserves\" reports. But this <strong>doesn't show the liabilities<\/strong> \u2013 the reserves may exist, but meanwhile the exchange may owe others. For the full picture, <strong>proof-of-liabilities<\/strong> is also needed, which shows the exchange's total liability position.<\/p>\n<h3>4. Due diligence failed at VCs too<\/h3>\n<p>The world's most experienced venture capital investors didn't conduct meaningful due diligence. Sequoia later admitted: at FTX <strong>there was no board of directors<\/strong>, there was no CFO, and financial record-keeping was chaotic. This warns that even the biggest investors can make mistakes if they don't conduct proper due diligence.<\/p>\n<h2>The FTX Legacy<\/h2>\n<p>The FTX collapse paradoxically <strong>strengthened the crypto industry<\/strong>:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Weak, unreliable players were eliminated from the market, creating a cleaner competitive landscape.<\/li>\n<li>Regulation accelerated, strengthening market stability.<\/li>\n<li>Institutional investors demand higher standards, increasing market professionalism.<\/li>\n<li>The self-custody culture strengthened, as users increasingly take management of their crypto assets into their own hands.<\/li>\n<li>Hardware wallet sales hit records in 2023, showing growing demand for secure storage solutions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Practical Tips<\/h2>\n<p>How Can We Protect Ourselves from Similar Future Events?<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Study the exchanges:<\/strong> Don't overlook exchanges' financial reports and transparency information.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Use a hardware wallet:<\/strong> Keep your crypto assets safe in a hardware wallet like Ledger or Trezor.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Be cautious with your investments:<\/strong> Don't invest on exchanges you don't know enough about, and always do thorough research.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Follow regulatory developments:<\/strong> Stay up to date with changes in the crypto world's regulatory environment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>In Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>The FTX story is both a <strong>warning and a catalyst<\/strong> . A warning that in the world of cryptocurrencies, trust cannot replace verification. And a catalyst that accelerated the industry's professionalization. The events teach us that decentralization and personal responsibility are crucial in the crypto world.<\/p>\n<p><em>Sam Bankman-Fried doesn't embody the failure of cryptocurrencies \u2013 but rather the failure of unsupervised, centralized power. Exactly what Bitcoin's decentralization was designed to solve.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2>Sources<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.coindesk.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">CoinDesk<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cointelegraph.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">CoinTelegraph<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.investopedia.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Investopedia<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>\u26a0\ufe0f Legal disclaimer:<\/strong> This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. All investment decisions are made at your own risk.<\/p>\n<p><!-- IMAGE_PROMPT: Family Guy cartoon style illustration of a giant house of cards made of FTT tokens collapsing dramatically, with SBF-looking character (curly hair, shorts, t-shirt) falling through the cards, Peter Griffin and friends watching from a safe distance holding hardware wallets labeled \"Ledger\" and \"Trezor\", a banner in the ruins reading \"Not Your Keys Not Your Coins\", news reporter Tom Tucker covering the disaster live --><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Az FTX \u00f6sszeoml\u00e1s: a kripto Lehman Brothers pillanata 2022. november 11-\u00e9n az FTX \u2013 a vil\u00e1g harmadik legnagyobb kriptot\u0151zsd\u00e9je \u2013 cs\u0151dv\u00e9delmet k\u00e9rt. Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF), az egykor 26 milli\u00e1rd doll\u00e1rosra becs\u00fclt alap\u00edt\u00f3, b\u00f6rt\u00f6nbe ker\u00fclt. Milli\u00e1rdnyi \u00fcgyf\u00e9lp\u00e9nz t\u0171nt el. Most, t\u00f6bb mint h\u00e1rom \u00e9vvel k\u00e9s\u0151bb, mit tanultunk ebb\u0151l a megh\u00f6kkent\u0151 esem\u00e9nyb\u0151l, \u00e9s hogyan alak\u00edtotta \u00e1t a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":669,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,12],"tags":[149,4,158,161,153,156,152,148,136,143,5,163],"class_list":["post-510","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-hirek","category-tozsde","tag-binance","tag-bitcoin","tag-europa","tag-ftx","tag-mica","tag-piac","tag-sec","tag-solana","tag-szabalyozas","tag-token","tag-tozsde","tag-wallet"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/510","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=510"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/510\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":701,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/510\/revisions\/701"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/669"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=510"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=510"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kriptoblog.hu\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=510"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}